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  II.-339 
BREAKING DOWN THE WALL AROUND 
JUDICIAL REVIEW IN THE IMMIGRATION 
CONTEXT: EXAMINING WHETHER § 1252(g) 
PRECLUDES REVIEW OF NONCITIZEN FTCA 
CLAIMS FOR WRONGFUL REMOVAL IN 
VIOLATION OF A COURT ORDER 
Abstract: On August 9, 2018, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Arce v. Unit-
ed States held that a jurisdiction-stripping provision of the Immigration and Na-
tionality Act does not preclude judicial review of damages claims brought by 
noncitizens. The Ninth Circuit’s holding opened the door for noncitizens who 
were wrongfully removed from the United States in violation of a court order or 
automatic stay to pursue damages. In doing so, the Ninth Circuit departed from 
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, which held that the Act precluded nonciti-
zens’ damages claims. This Comment argues that the Ninth Circuit’s holding was 
correct because the ability of noncitizens to bring damages claims for their 
wrongful removal serves as a meaningful check on the power of immigration 
agencies to carry out immigration policy. Further, the ability of noncitizens to 
bring damages claims aligns with the policy goals of the Federal Tort Claims Act. 
INTRODUCTION 
Immigration courts in the United States lack the resources to efficiently 
manage the flood of cases that inundate the system .1 One consequence of an 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Denise Lu & Derek Watkins, Court Backlog May Prove Bigger Barrier for Migrants Than 
Any Wall, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/01/24/us/migrants-
border-immigration-court.html [https://perma.cc/7HYG-PKFF] (explaining that the backlog of pend-
ing immigration cases has increased “by nearly fifty percent since [President] Trump took office in 
2017”); see also Immigration Court Backlog Tool, TRANSACTIONAL REC. ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, 
https://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/court_backlog/ [https://perma.cc/8N5U-LS3U] (tracking the 
total number of pending cases and wait time for resolution by nationality, state, court, and hearing loca-
tion and noting that the active backlog has surpassed one million cases as of September 2019). Although 
a backlog of pending immigration cases is not a new issue, the crisis in the immigration courts has been 
largely exacerbated by the Trump administration’s aggressive immigration policy agenda. Julia Preston 
& Andrew R. Calderon, How Trump Broke the Immigration Courts, POLITICO (July 16, 2019), https://
www.politico.com/magazine/story/2019/07/16/trump-ice-raids-immigration-courts-arent-ready-227
359 [https://perma.cc/68MR-XMLV]. The Trump administration’s policy agenda is aimed at preventing 
an influx of immigrants into the country and rapidly removing any illegal immigrants already in the 
country. Compare Richard Gonzales, Immigration Courts ‘Operating in Crisis Mode,’ Judges Say, NPR, 
(Feb. 23, 2015, 4:21 AM), https://www.npr.org/2015/02/23/387825094/immigration-courts-operating-
in-crisis-mode-judges-say [https://perma.cc/843Q-FS7T] (discussing how the Obama administration’s 
policy of prioritizing the resolution of immigration cases involving unaccompanied minors delayed the 
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overburdened system is the increased likelihood of error.2 In the context of 
immigration policy, the cost of error is particularly grim because of the possi-
bility of removing individuals who have a legal right to remain in the country.3 
The cases of Mark Daniel Lyttle and Jesus Eduard Lopez Silva highlight the 
perils of errors in the execution of immigration policy.4 Both cases involved 
the wrongful removal of an individual from the United States.5 There was one 
major distinction, however—Lyttle was a U.S. citizen, whereas Silva was not.6 
                                                                                                                           
resolution of hundreds of thousands of other pending cases), with Preston, supra note 1 (detailing how 
the Trump administration’s policies aimed at expediting and resolving the immigration case backlog 
actually intensified the problem). 
 2 See Caitlin Dickerson, An Afghan War Widower Is Caught up in a ‘Chronic Problem’: Wrongful 
Deportation, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 16, 2019) https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/16/us/soldier-spouse-
deported-phoenix.html [https://perma.cc/NWB5-YY9G] (describing wrongful deportation as a “chronic 
problem” in the United States and stating that “[t]here is a long history of wrongful deportations that 
span several administrations and they are only rarely reversed”); Beth Werlin, The Human Cost of 
Fast-Track Deportation, N.Y. TIMES (July 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/25/opinion/
politics/expedited-deportation-trump-immigration.html [https://perma.cc/Z557-GKX5] (describing 
how expedited removal policies increase the likelihood of removing individuals who are legally enti-
tled to remain in the United States). 
 3 See Esha Bhandari, Yes, the U.S. Wrongfully Deports Its Own Citizens, ACLU (Apr. 25, 2013, 
11:45 a.m.), https://www.aclu.org/blog/speakeasy/yes-us-wrongfully-deports-its-own-citizens [https://
perma.cc/G2JL-FZ6X] (explaining how Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents have 
mistakenly detained and deported U.S. citizens); Werlin, supra note 2, (describing how the costs of 
wrongful removal are particularly acute for asylum seekers who could face serious harm or death if 
returned to their countries of origin); see also Tiziana Rinaldi, When the Government Wrongly De-
ports People, Coming Back to the U.S. Is Almost Impossible, PUB. RADIO INT’L (July 26, 2018, 10:30 
AM) https://www.pri.org/stories/2018-07-26/when-government-wrongly-deports-people-coming-back-
us-almost-impossible [https://perma.cc/P9E5-PU8X] (discussing the difficulties that individuals who 
were wrongfully removed from the United States face in attempting to return to the country due to 
long delays in proceedings and the inability to afford an attorney to navigate the appeals process). 
 4 See infra notes 6–12 and accompany text (detailing the cases of Mark Daniel Lyttle and Jesus 
Eduard Lopez Silva). 
 5 See generally Silva v. United States, 866 F.3d 938 (8th Cir. 2017) (involving the wrongful re-
moval of a lawful permanent resident); Lyttle v. United States, 867 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1266, 1302 
(M.D. Ga. 2012) (involving the wrongful removal of a U.S. citizen). 
 6 Compare Lyttle, 867 F. Supp. 2d at 1266, 1302 (holding that a U.S. citizen had successfully 
stated a claim for violation of the Federal Torts Claim Act (FTCA) due to harm suffered as a result of 
being wrongfully removed from the United States), with Silva, 866 F.3d at 939 (holding that a nonciti-
zen’s FTCA claim for wrongful removal from the United States was barred by a jurisdiction-stripping 
provision in the Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA)). The Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) consolidated two previously distinct processes of exclusion 
and deportation into a new process referred to as removal. See Daniel Kanstroom, Surrounding the 
Hole in the Doughnut: Discretion and Deference in U.S. Immigration Law, 71 TUL. L. REV. 703, 705 
n.2 (1997). Exclusion was the formal term for the process of denying a noncitizen entry into the Unit-
ed States. Definition of Terms, DEP’T. OF HOMELAND SEC., https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/
data-standards-and-definitions/definition-terms#4 [https://perma.cc/Q9KC-HA52]. By contrast, depor-
tation was the formal term for the expulsion of a noncitizen from the United States based on a finding 
that the noncitizen violated immigration laws. Id. Under the IIRIRA, removal encompassed both of 
these processes. Id. Thus, this Comment will use the term removal, except when directly quoting from 
sources of U.S. immigration law or other materials that predate the change in terminology. See id. 
Removal proceedings are initially conducted before administrative immigration court judges who 
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Lyttle, a U.S. citizen, was erroneously removed to Mexico with court ap-
proval after being arrested and misidentified as an undocumented illegal im-
migrant.7 Lyttle recovered monetary damages from the federal government for 
the harm he suffered as a result of this error by filing suit pursuant to the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act (FTCA).8 Silva, a lawful permanent resident in the United 
States for over a decade, but a Mexican citizen, was also removed to Mexico.9 
Silva was sent to Mexico in spite of a court order expressly prohibiting his re-
moval.10 Silva also brought claims for monetary damages pursuant to the 
FTCA.11 Unlike Lyttle, however, Silva was not merely denied relief but was 
precluded entirely from having his day in court because of a jurisdiction-
stripping provision contained in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).12 
                                                                                                                           
operate under the purview of the Department of Justice within the executive branch. Caroline Hol-
liday, Comment, U.S. Citizens Detained and Deported? A Test of the Great Writ’s Reach in Protect-
ing Due Process Rights in Removal Proceedings, 60 B.C. L. REV. E-SUPP. II-217, 220–21 (2019) 
https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol60/iss9/16 [https://perma.cc/4NK7-M4QS]; see also John 
Gavin, Note, Finally Freed or Infinitely Detained? The Need for a Clear Standard of Finality for 
Reinstated Orders of Removal, 59 B.C. L. REV. 2437, 2445–51 (2018) (providing an in-depth over-
view of the removal proceeding process). Courts have referred to the process of removing someone 
from the United States erroneously as a “wrongful deportation;” however, this Comment will refer to 
that process as a “wrongful removal” except when directly quoting language from judicial opinions. 
See Rachel E. Rosenbloom, Remedies for the Wrongly Deported: Territoriality, Finality, and the 
Significance of Departure, 33 U. HAW. L. REV. 139, 152–53 (2010) (describing various categories of 
government action that constitute wrongful removal and noting that the list is not exhaustive because 
new actions that have not yet occurred can qualify). 
 7 Lyttle, 867 F. Supp. 2d at 1277. See generally William Finnegan, The Deportation Machine, 
NEW YORKER (Apr. 29, 2013) https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/04/29/the-deportation-
machine [https://perma.cc/78C5-SCSK] (describing the Lyttle case and detailing the systemic failures 
in the U.S. immigration system that enabled this error to occur). 
 8 Lyttle, 867 F. Supp. 2d at 1267; see Esha Bhandari, U.S. Citizen Wrongfully Deported to Mexi-
co, Settles His Case Against the Federal Government, ACLU (Oct. 5, 2012, 12:15 AM) https://www.
aclu.org/blog/speakeasy/us-citizen-wrongfully-deported-mexico-settles-his-case-against-federal-
government?redirect=blog/immigrants-rights/us-citizen-wrongfully-deported-mexico-settles-his-case-
against-federal [https://perma.cc/ZTJ8-C7ME] (reporting that Lyttle settled his FTCA claims with the 
federal government for $175,000 after being wrongly detained and deported by ICE despite being a 
U.S. citizen). The FTCA gives federal district courts exclusive jurisdiction over claims where the 
United States can be held liable for tort claims in the same manner and to the same extent as private 
individuals under similar circumstances. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671–2680 (2018). A cognizable FTCA claim 
is one that is: (1) against the United States; (2) for money damages; (3) for injury or loss of property, 
or personal injury or death; (4) caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee 
of the government; (5) while acting within the scope of his office or employment; (6) under circum-
stances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with 
the law of the place where the act or omission occurred. FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 477 (1994) 
(quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1) (2018)). 
 9 Silva, 866 F.3d at 939. 
 10 See id. (noting that when Silva filed an appeal to challenge the decision to remove him to Mex-
ico, the court issued an automatic stay barring his removal until the appeal was resolved). 
 11 Id. at 939. 
 12 Id.; see infra notes 57–78 and accompanying text (discussing the Eighth Circuit’s holding in 
Silva that a jurisdiction-stripping provision of the INA precludes judicial review of FTCA claims 
arising from wrongful removal from the United States). 
II.-342 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 61:E. Supp. 
The fact that Lyttle recovered damages but Silva was barred was not due to the 
underlying merits of each case.13 Rather, their different citizenship statuses 
solely determined the different results.14 Although this may seem unfair, it is 
not entirely surprising.15 
Political discourse in the United States has thrust immigration policy to 
the forefront of national debate and increasingly politicized the issue.16 Alt-
hough immigration policies and decisions often receive extreme scrutiny and 
criticism in the public sphere, they are largely insulated from judicial review.17 
In the immigration context, courts recognize that the power of the legislative 
and executive branch is plenary.18 Thus, the judiciary affords Congress great 
deference in developing and implementing immigration policy.19 
                                                                                                                           
 13 See Silva, 866 F.3d at 942 (affirming the dismissal of Silva’s FTCA claims for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction pursuant to a jurisdiction-stripping provision in the INA); Lyttle, 867 F. Supp. 2d at 
1301 (denying the government’s motion to dismiss and allowing Lyttle’s FTCA claim to proceed); see 
also Stephen H. Legomsky, Fear and Loathing in Congress and the Courts: Immigration and Judicial 
Review, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1615, 1632 (2000) (noting that in the current U.S. immigration system, the 
availability of judicial review of a claim depends on the nationality of the litigant). 
 14 Legomsky, supra note 13, at 1632. 
 15 See Sameer Ahmed, INA Section 242(G): Immigration Agents, Immunity, and Damages Suits, 
119 YALE L.J. 625, 626 (2009) (discussing how the federal government has repeatedly used the juris-
diction-stripping statutes of the INA to preclude courts from reviewing monetary damages claims 
made by noncitizens). 
 16 See Peter Beinart, Why America Is Fighting About Immigration, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 26, 2018), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/01/politicians-immigration/551537/ [https://perma.
cc/Y7NC-MGVW] (stating that immigration has become a central issue in American politics); see 
also Jeffery M. Jones, New High in U.S. Say Immigration Most Important Problem, GALLUP (June 21, 
2019), https://news.gallup.com/poll/259103/new-high-say-immigration-important-problem.aspx [https://
perma.cc/BYF6-Q9C8] (reporting that “twenty three percent of Americans name [immigration] as the 
most important problem facing the country,” which is the highest number in the poll’s history). 
 17 See Legomsky, supra note 13, at 1615 (observing that immigration policy and judicial review 
have historically had an “oil-and-water relationship”); see also Kevin R. Johnson, Immigration in the 
Supreme Court, 2009–13: A New Era of Immigration Law Unexceptionalism, 68 OKLA. L. REV. 57, 
58–59 (2015) (noting that immigration law diverges significantly from the core principles present in 
other areas of the U.S legal system because it is largely shielded from judicial review). Judicial review 
is a core tenet of the U.S. legal system. About the Supreme Court, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.
gov/about-federal-courts/educational-resources/about-educational-outreach/activity-resources/about 
[https://perma.cc/9UMW-SJKZ]. It is a process whereby the actions of the legislative and executive 
branches are subject to judicial scrutiny to ensure their actions are constitutional. Id. 
 18 See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power, 100 YALE L.J. 
545, 547 (1990) (explaining that the plenary power doctrine provides Congress and the executive 
branch with sweeping and largely exclusive authority to develop and implement immigration policy); 
see also Johnson, supra note 17, at 58 (explaining that the concept of plenary power as a means of 
insulating immigration decisions from judicial review emerged as a result of the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 605 (1889)). Chae Chan Ping involved 
the Chinese exclusion laws that Congress passed in 1882 to prevent Chinese laborers from entering 
the United States. 130 U.S. at 589. The Supreme Court held that the federal government has the au-
thority to exclude certain noncitizens from the country, and that this power is derived from concerns 
regarding national security, territorial sovereignty, and self-preservation. Id. at 605; Motomura, supra, 
at 551–52. The Supreme Court further held that if Congress determines that the exclusion of certain 
noncitizens from the United States is essential to the nation’s peace and security, it has the absolute 
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Shielding immigration policy from judicial review raises numerous ques-
tions.20 What recourse is available when immigration agencies act unlawful-
ly?21 What rights do noncitizens have to seek damages for harm they have suf-
fered, and what power do courts have to hear such claims?22 If the preclusion 
of judicial review in the context of immigration policy is absolute, do courts 
lack authority to enforce their rulings if the government fails to abide by 
them?23 What checks exist, if any at all, on the political branches’ powers over 
immigration matters?24 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed precisely 
these questions in 2018 in Arce v. United States.25 
In Arce, Claudio Anaya Arce was deported to Mexico despite the issuance 
of a court order explicitly prohibiting his removal until the adjudication of his 
appeal.26 Upon his court-mandated return to the United States, Arce, like Lyttle 
                                                                                                                           
authority to act, and courts should not interfere. Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 606; see also Fong Yue 
Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 705, 707 (1893) (extending the plenary power doctrine to include the 
absolute right of the federal government to deport noncitizens). 
 19 See Peter H. Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 14 
(1984) (describing the notion that with respect to immigration law, judges should be “seen—if abso-
lutely necessary—but not heard”). As a result of the plenary power, courts historically have afforded a 
high degree of deference to legislative and executive decision-making with respect to immigration 
policy development and implementation. See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (recognizing 
that Congress has near complete control over the admission and expulsion of immigrants and this 
power is “largely immune” from judicial review); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588–89 
(1952) (noting that immigration policy is “exclusively entrusted” to the political branches of govern-
ment and thus beyond the scope of judicial review). 
 20 See Legomsky, supra note 13, at 1632 (noting that the denial of judicial review in the immigra-
tion context is especially problematic given the vulnerability of immigrants due to their severe un-
derrepresentation in the political process). 
 21 See id. at 1631 (suggesting that the availability of judicial review in immigration cases is im-
portant because it serves as a deterrent for immigration agencies and ensures they act in accordance 
with the law). 
 22 Compare Arce v. United States, 899 F.3d 796, 800 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding that 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(g) (2018) of the INA does not deprive courts of jurisdiction to hear claims brought by a 
noncitizen for harm suffered as a result of the government’s decision to remove them from the United 
States in violation of a court order to stay removal), with Silva, 866 F.3d at 939 (holding that 
§ 1252(g) of the INA strips courts of jurisdiction to hear similar claims brought by noncitizens). 
 23 Arce, 899 F.3d at 801; see Oral Argument, Arce, 899 F.3d 796 (No. 16-56706), 2018 WL 
6599921 (inquiring whether a court would have the authority to initiate contempt proceedings against 
the federal government for violating a court order under a broad interpretation of the exclusive juris-
diction provision in the INA). 
 24 See Sarah A. Moore, Tearing Down the Fence Around Immigration Law: Examining the Lack 
of Judicial Review and the Impact of the REAL ID Act While Calling for a Broader Reading of Ques-
tions of Law to Encompass “Extreme Cruelty,” 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2037, 2063 (2007) (quoting 
Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828, 830 (7th Cir. 2005)) (suggesting that the lack of judicial re-
view in the immigration context has led to adjudication of cases that fall below the “minimum stand-
ards of legal justice”); see also Legomsky, supra note 13, at 1617 (observing that under the current 
immigration system, “Congress has a virtual blank check to formulate the immigration policies it 
thinks best”). 
 25 See generally Arce, 899 F.3d. 796. 
 26 Id. at 799. 
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and Silva, filed suit in the Ninth Circuit for damages under the FTCA for harm 
suffered as a result of his wrongful removal.27 The federal government argued 
that the Ninth Circuit lacked the requisite authority to hear Arce’s claims pur-
suant to the jurisdiction-stripping provision in the INA.28 The statute, known as 
the exclusive jurisdiction provision, prohibits judicial review of claims that 
relate to decisions by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).29 Specifi-
cally, the provision applies to decisions to commence, adjudicate, or effectuate 
removal proceedings against noncitizens.30 One year earlier, the Eighth Circuit 
Court of Appeals accepted this exact argument in Silva, which involved similar 
facts.31 Deviating from its sister court’s ruling, the Ninth Circuit held that 
Arce’s claims were not precluded by the exclusive jurisdiction provision.32 
Part I of this Comment discusses Congress’s narrowing of the availability 
of judicial review in the immigration context under the INA and its various 
amendments.33 Part I further explains how the Supreme Court has interpreted 
the exclusive jurisdiction provision and outlines the facts and the contrary 
holdings of the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Silva and the Ninth Circuit’s ruling 
in Arce.34 Part II explores the policy implications of the Eighth Circuit’s ruling 
in Silva and identifies problematic separation of powers issues that the case 
raises.35 Lastly, Part III of this Comment argues that the Ninth Circuit’s hold-
ing is a check on executive power because allowing noncitizens to recover 
damages serves as a meaningful deterrent to ensure immigration agencies act 
within the bounds of their legal authority.36 
I. CONGRESS LIMITS JUDICIAL REVIEW OF REMOVAL PROCEEDINGS 
Although judicial review of executive and legislative action is a funda-
mental aspect of the U.S. legal system, this is not the case with respect to im-
                                                                                                                           
 27 Id. at 798. After learning of Arce’s removal from the United States, the Ninth Circuit issued an 
order requiring that the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) return Arce to the United States 
until his appeal was adjudicated. Id. 
 28 Id. at 799. 
 29 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) (“[N]o court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on 
behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to commence proceed-
ings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien under this chapter.”). 
 30 Id. 
 31 Silva, 866 F.3d at 940. 
 32 See Arce, 899 F.3d at 801 (acknowledging the Eighth Circuit’s acceptance of the government’s 
arguments that the claims were precluded under § 1252(g), but disagreeing with the Eight Circuit for 
the reasons set forth in the opinion). 
 33 See infra notes 37–50 and accompanying text. 
 34 See infra notes 51–96 and accompanying text. 
 35 See infra notes 97–122 and accompanying text. 
 36 See infra notes 124–132 and accompanying text. 
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migration policy.37 The plenary power doctrine, which established a norm of 
judicial deference, is a judge-made doctrine that limits judicial review of im-
migration policy.38 Congress has also limited judicial review over immigration 
policy through positive statutory law.39 In 1952, Congress passed the INA, 
which constitutes the core body of U.S. immigration law.40 The INA has been 
amended several times since its enactment.41 The Illegal Immigration Reform 
and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), which Congress passed in 1996, 
further narrowed the availability of judicial review in the immigration con-
text.42 The IIRIRA codified the exclusive jurisdiction provision, which is at 
issue in this Comment.43 
Section A of this Part explores the impact the exclusive jurisdiction provi-
sion has on the availability of judicial review of removal proceedings for 
noncitizens.44 Section A further explains the Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
the exclusive jurisdiction provision, in 1999, in Reno v. American-Arab Anti-
Discrimination Committee (AADC), which narrowed the provision’s scope.45 
                                                                                                                           
 37 See supra note 17 and accompanying text (discussing the absence of judicial review in the 
immigration context); Schuck, supra note 19, at 1 (noting that immigration law is a “maverick” in the 
American legal system because it is largely shielded from judicial review). 
 38 See supra notes 18–19 and accompanying text (discussing the plenary power doctrine). 
 39 Legomsky, supra note 13, at 1623. 
 40 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1537 (2018) (codifying the INA). The U.S. Constitution vests Congress 
with the sole authority to establish uniform policies concerning immigration and naturalization. U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
 41 See generally Public Laws Amending the INA, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS., https://
www.uscis.gov/ilink/docView/PUBLAW/HTML/PUBLAW/0-0-0-1.html [https://perma.cc/L6KK-
MX28] (listing the various amendments to the INA since its passage in 1952). 
 42 See Gerald L. Neuman, Jurisdiction and the Rule of Law After the 1996 Immigration Act, 113 
HARV. L. REV. 1963, 1975–76 (2000) (providing an overview of the impact of various immigration 
reform legislation on the availability of judicial review over immigration decisions). Congress passed 
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) and the REAL ID Act of 2005, 
which both also placed statutory restraints on the ability of the judiciary to review removal orders 
issued by the government against noncitizens. See Kanstroom, supra note 6, at 704–05 (describing the 
passage of the AEDPA and the IIRIRA as “the most fundamental statutory restructuring of immigra-
tion law in two hundred years” and noting that a central feature of both pieces of legislation is the 
severe curtailment of judicial review); see also Veena Reddy, Judicial Review of Final Orders of 
Removal in the Wake of the Real ID Act, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 557, 570 (2008) (discussing the impact of 
the REAL ID Act on the ability of the judiciary to review removal orders). But see Patricia Flynn & 
Judith Patterson, Five Years Later: Fifth Circuit Case Law Developments Under the Illegal Immigra-
tion Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, 53 BAYLOR L. REV. 557, 561 (2001) (acknowledging 
that the INA amendments can be viewed as “long overdue” changes to “simplify and streamline” 
removal procedures). The exclusive jurisdiction provision, which is at issue in this Comment, was 
passed under IIRIRA, and thus, this Comment’s analysis is limited to the impact and significance of 
IIRIRA. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). 
 43 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). 
 44 See infra notes 47–50 and accompanying text. 
 45 See infra notes 51–56 and accompanying text. 
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Sections B and C discuss Silva and Arce’s respective cases and provide over-
views of the Eighth and Ninth Circuit’s rationales for their contrary decisions.46 
A. Congress Passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and  
Immigrant Responsibility Act that Further Expanded  
Restrictions on Judicial Review 
In 1996, Congress passed the IIRIRA “to streamline removal proceedings 
and enhance enforcement of immigration laws.”47 The exclusive jurisdiction 
provision prohibits judicial review of claims brought by noncitizens related to 
the DHS’s decision to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute 
removal orders.48 The provision applies to claims arising from all past, present, 
or future proceedings related to the removal of noncitizens.49 Shortly after the 
                                                                                                                           
 46 See infra notes 57–96 and accompanying text. 
 47 Flynn & Patterson, supra note 42, at 560–61. Prior to the passage of the IIRIRA, 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1105(a) (2018) governed judicial review of immigration matters under the INA. Reno v. Am.-Arab 
Anti-Discrimination Comm. (AADC), 525 U.S. 471, 475 (1999). In 1996, Congress repealed the ear-
lier provision and implemented a much more restrictive judicial review procedure. Id. Despite the 
stated goals of streamlining removal proceedings and preventing undue delay, some members of Con-
gress expressed discomfort about the idea of limiting judicial review of removal orders. See Ahmed, 
supra note 15, at 628–29 (quoting Congressman Jerrold Nadler’s concern that the new provision 
would place Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) decisions entirely outside of judicial re-
view). Congressman Nadler stressed that it is a slippery slope to allow government agencies to act 
without any means of judicial questioning. Id. 
 48 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). The INA defines any person that is not a citizen or national of the United 
States as an alien. § 1101(a)(3). Due to the dehumanizing nature of the term alien, however, this 
Comment will use the term “noncitizen” unless directly quoting language of applicable U.S. immigra-
tion law. See Elizabeth Rosenman, This New Year, Let’s Stop Using the Word ‘Alien,’ THE HILL (Jan. 
2, 2019) https://thehill.com/opinion/immigration/423570-this-new-year-lets-stop-using-the-word-alien 
[https://perma.cc/HWC9-J9E4] (discussing the offensive and dehumanizing connotations of the term 
alien in U.S. immigration discourse). Initially under the INA, Congress delegated its authority with 
respect to the implementation and execution of immigration policy to the Attorney General. 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1103(a). The Attorney General further delegated their authority to the Commissioner of Immigration 
and Nationalization and the various employees and officers of the INS. Id. In the wake of the September 
11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Congress established the DHS pursuant to the Homeland Security Act of 2002. 
8 C.F.R. § 2.1 (2020). Congress abolished the INS and transferred the immigration enforcement powers 
of the Attorney General to the Secretary of the DHS (Secretary). 6 U.S.C. § 202(3) (2018). Thus, some 
cases and sources discussed in this Comment refer to the Attorney General as having enforcement power; 
however, all such references herein refer to the Secretary. See, e.g., Arce, 899 F.3d at 799 n.4 (noting 
that for simplicity all references to the Attorney General in the opinion refer to the Secretary who 
currently has true enforcement authority pursuant to a congressional directive). 
 49 AADC, 525 U.S. at 477. Under IIRIRA, Congress created two categories of rules governing 
availability of judicial review: transitional and permanent. See Neuman, supra note 42, at 1976 (ex-
plaining that transitional procedures applied to cases that were pending prior to the passage of the act, 
whereas permanent provisions applied to all cases initiated on or after the date the IIRIRA took ef-
fect). Section 1252(g) is unique in that it was the only “permanent” provision that was also applicable 
to pending cases. Id. at 1982. 
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IIRIRA took effect, there was disagreement over how broadly to interpret the 
exclusive jurisdiction provision.50 
In 1999, in AADC, the Supreme Court clarified the purpose of the exclu-
sive jurisdiction provision by holding that it should be read narrowly.51 The 
Court held that the provision only applies to judicial review of noncitizens’ 
claims challenging their removal in three distinct actions.52 Specifically, the 
provision prohibits judicial review only when the claims are related to (1) the 
commencement of proceedings, (2) the adjudication of cases, or (3) the execu-
tion of removal orders by the Secretary of the DHS (Secretary).53 
The issue of the exclusive jurisdiction provision’s scope resurfaced in a 
circuit split between the Eighth and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals.54 The 
question at issue was whether the statute prohibits noncitizens from bringing 
claims in search of damages for their wrongful removal.55 More specifically, the 
courts considered whether the exclusive jurisdiction provision precludes federal 
                                                                                                                           
 50 See Neuman, supra note 42, at 1982–83 (discussing how initially § 1252(g) was interpreted 
broadly, which resulted in circuit splits over whether the provision precluded judicial review of habeas 
claims brought by noncitizens). 
 51 See AADC, 525 U.S. at 482 (limiting § 1252(g) to preclude judicial review of claims brought 
by noncitizens relating only to “three discrete actions” taken by the Attorney General, namely, claims 
related to a decision or action to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or executive removal or-
ders). AADC involved a suit brought by a group of noncitizens who challenged the government’s 
decision to deport them by arguing that they were targeted because of their connections with a politi-
cal group. See id. at 472–73 (noting that the petitioners in the case were members of the Popular Front 
for the Liberation of Palestine, which was characterized by the federal government as an international 
terrorist and communist organization). The district court granted the petitioners a preliminary injunc-
tion that halted the deportation proceedings brought against them. Id. at 471. The Supreme Court held 
that § 1252(g) barred the petitioner’s claims because they arose from the decision of the Attorney 
General to commence removal proceedings against them. Id. at 487. 
 52 Id. at 482. 
 53 Id. at 482–83. The Court analogized the exclusive jurisdiction provision to the exercise of prose-
cutorial discretion in the criminal context. See id. at 489–90 (discussing various factors that make pros-
ecutorial decision-making in the criminal context ill-suited to judicial review and noting that “[t]hese 
concerns are greatly magnified in the deportation context”). In the immigration context, prosecutorial 
discretion describes the ability of immigration agencies to decide whom to commence removal pro-
ceedings against. Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, The Immigration Prosecutor and the Judge: Examining 
the Role of the Judiciary in Prosecutorial Discretion Decisions, 16 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 39, 42, 45, 
48–49 (2013). It also gives immigration agencies the ability to extend relief from removal to certain 
noncitizens through mechanisms including asylum, cancellation of removal, or adjustment of status. 
See id. at 45 (summarizing the history of the use of prosecutorial discretion by immigration officials 
and noting that it is most often used to provide relief on humanitarian grounds). 
 54 Compare Arce, 899 F.3d at 800 (holding that § 1252(g) of the INA does not deprive courts of 
jurisdiction to hear claims for harm suffered as a result of the government’s decision to remove a 
noncitizen from the United States in violation of a court order to stay deportation), with Silva, 866 
F.3d at 939 (holding that § 1252(g) of the INA strips courts of jurisdiction to hear claims brought by 
noncitizens seeking damages for harm suffered as a result of their removal from the United States in 
violation of a court order). 
 55 See Ahmed, supra note 15, at 626 (discussing the split amongst the circuit courts regarding 
whether § 1252(g) prevents noncitizens from bringing damages claims). 
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courts from hearing claims brought by noncitizens under the FTCA for wrongful 
removal from the United States in violation of a court order or automatic stay.56 
B. The Eighth Circuit Held That § 1252(g) Precluded Judicial  
Review of FTCA Claims for Wrongful Removal 
In 2017, in Silva, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the exclu-
sive jurisdiction provision precluded federal courts from hearing noncitizen 
FTCA claims for wrongful removal.57 In April of 2012, the federal government 
initiated removal proceedings against Jesus Eduard Lopez Silva as a result of 
his conviction for two crimes in Minnesota.58 Although an immigration judge 
ordered that Silva be removed to Mexico, Silva filed a timely appeal challeng-
ing the immigration judge’s determination.59 The appeal triggered the issuance 
of an automatic stay, which prohibited federal agents from executing Silva’s 
removal until the adjudication of his appeal.60 
Irrespective of the stay, the government deported Silva to Mexico in July 
of 2013.61 Realizing their error, however, federal agents returned Silva to the 
United States in September of 2013.62 Upon his reentry into the country, Silva 
brought suit against the United States government in the U.S. District Court for 
the District of Minnesota pursuant to the FTCA.63 Silva sought compensation 
for harms that arose from his wrongful removal from the country.64 The district 
court dismissed Silva’s claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant 
                                                                                                                           
 56 See generally Jason B. Binimow, Annotation, Effect of 8 U.S.C.A. § 1252(g) upon Jurisdiction 
to Hear Federal Tort Claims Act Claims of Noncitizen Wrongfully Removed in Violation of Court 
Order or Automatic Stay, 37 A.L.R. Fed. 3d Art. 4 (2018) (discussing how various courts have ad-
dressed the issue of whether noncitizens have standing under § 1252(g) to bring damages suits under 
the FTCA for their wrongful removal from the United States in violation of a court order or automatic 
stay). In the immigration context, a stay is a decision issued by an immigration judge that temporarily 
prevents the removal of a noncitizen from the United States. Fact Sheet: BIA Emergency Stay Re-
quests, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST. EXECUTIVE OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV. (Mar. 2018), https://www.justice.
gov/eoir/page/file/1043831/download [https://perma.cc/4PBW-WQEV]. Stays can be discretionary or 
automatic. Id. An automatic stay is issued when a noncitizen files an appeal of an immigration judge’s 
decision to remove them. Id. 
 57 Silva, 866 F.3d at 939. 
 58 Id. Silva was a Mexican citizen and he had been a lawful permanent resident of the United States 
since 1992. Id. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id.; see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.6 (“[T]he decision in any proceeding under this chapter from 
which an appeal to the Board may be taken shall not be executed during the time allowed for the filing 
of an appeal . . . nor shall such decision be executed while an appeal is pending or while a case is 
before the Board by way of certification.”). 
 61 Silva, 866 F.3d at 939. 
 62 Id. After Silva’s return to the United States, an immigration judge granted his application for 
the cancelation of his removal, and Silva was able to remain lawfully in the country. Id. 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. 
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to the exclusive jurisdiction provision of the INA.65 The district court accepted 
the government’s position that the exclusive jurisdiction provision barred Sil-
va’s suit because his claims arose from the decision to execute his removal.66 
Silva appealed the district court’s decision to the Eighth Circuit.67 
In Silva, the Eighth Circuit ultimately affirmed the district court’s deter-
mination and held that the exclusive jurisdiction provision prohibited the court 
from hearing Silva’s FTCA claims.68 In his appeal, Silva presented two prima-
ry arguments as to why his claims were not precluded.69 First, Silva argued 
that his claims did not arise from the decision by the Secretary to effectuate his 
removal, but instead they arose from the government’s violation of the order to 
stay the execution of his removal.70 The Eighth Circuit rejected this characteri-
zation and held that Silva’s claims were precluded because the violation of the 
stay was connected to the decision to execute his removal.71 Thus, in determin-
ing whether federal courts have jurisdiction over a noncitizen’s FTCA claims, 
the court held it was irrelevant that the execution of the removal order occurred 
in violation of a court order.72 
                                                                                                                           
 65 Id. Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and therefore they can only adjudicate cases 
that fall within the scope of their authority. Martin H. Redish & Sopan Joshi, Litigating Article III 
Standing: A Proposed Solution to the Serious (but Unrecognized) Separation of Powers Problem, 162 
U. PA. L. REV. 1373, 1378–79 (2014). If a federal court determines that a particular claim is beyond 
the scope of their authority, they are required to dismiss the claim without reaching the underlying 
merits of the case. Id. at 1391. 
 66 Silva, 866 F.3d. at 940. 
 67 Id. at 939. 
 68 Id. 
 69 Id. at 940–41. 
 70 Id. at 940. 
 71 Id. The court held that the exclusive jurisdiction provision precluded Silva’s claims by adopting 
the rule established by the Fifth Circuit in Humphries v. Various Federal U.S. INS Employees, 164 F.3d 
936, 943 (5th Cir. 1999), that a claim that is “connected directly and immediately” to a decision to effec-
tuate a removal order arises from that decision. Silva, 866 F.3d at 940. 
 72 Silva, 866 F.3d at 940. The Eighth Circuit adopted this reasoning from prior rulings by the 
Fifth and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals on whether § 1252(g) precluded noncitizens from bring-
ing claims for monetary damages. See Gupta v. McGahey, 709 F.3d 1062, 1065 (11th Cir. 2013) 
(holding that a noncitizen’s Bivens claims for monetary damages arose from the decision to com-
mence removal proceedings and thus were precluded under § 1252(g)); Foster v. Townsley, 243 F.3d 
210, 214–15 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that a noncitizen’s Bivens claims are directly connected to the 
decision to execute a deportation order, and thus under § 1252(g) the district court lacked jurisdiction 
to hear the claims); see also Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 
U.S. 388 (1999) (holding that the violation of an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights by federal 
officers confers standing for civil action in federal court). Foster and Gupta involved plaintiffs bring-
ing only Bivens actions for monetary damages and not claims under the FTCA, and therefore, they are 
not discussed at length in this Comment. See Ahmed, supra note 15, at 626 n.6 (distinguishing a 
Bivens action from claims brought pursuant to the FTCA). See generally Gupta, 709 F.3d 1062 (dis-
missing claimant’s Bivens action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to § 1252(g)); Foster, 
243 F.3d 210 (same). 
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Second, Silva argued that the exclusive jurisdiction provision only applied 
to discretionary decisions of the Secretary.73 Silva asserted that the issuance of 
the automatic stay, however, deprived the Secretary and his agents of the discre-
tion to make the decision to execute his removal.74 The Eighth Circuit deemed 
this argument unpersuasive.75 The court noted that the Supreme Court’s decision 
in AADC never explicitly stated that the statute applied only to discretionary de-
cisions.76 Furthermore, the Eighth Circuit noted the statutory silence on the dis-
tinction between discretionary and nondiscretionary decisions acts as evidence 
that such a distinction is irrelevant.77 For these reasons, the Eighth Circuit af-
firmed the district court’s determination that the exclusive jurisdiction provision 
prohibited federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over Silva’s FTCA claim.78 
C. The Ninth Circuit Came to the Opposite Conclusion That § 1252(g) Did 
Not Preclude Judicial Review of FTCA Claims for Wrongful Removal 
In 2018, in Arce, the Ninth Circuit split with the Eighth Circuit, holding 
that federal courts are not prohibited from hearing noncitizen FTCA claims 
relating to their wrongful removal from the United States.79 Claudio Anaya 
Arce, a Mexican citizen, was deported to Mexico in direct violation of a tem-
porary stay of removal issued by the Ninth Circuit.80 Upon his return to the 
                                                                                                                           
 73 Silva, 866 F.3d at 940. Silva asserted that the Supreme Court’s holding in AADC that § 1252(g) 
should be narrowly construed means that the scope of the statute is limited to discretionary decisions 
of the Secretary. Id.; see 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g); 525 U.S. at 482 (suggesting that the decisions by the 
Secretary to commence, adjudicate, or execute removal proceedings against a noncitizen are normally 
at the Secretary’s own discretion). 
 74 Silva, 866 F.3d at 940. The success of Silva’s argument depended on the Eighth Circuit making 
the assumption that the automatic stay deprived the Secretary and its agents of the authority to decide 
to execute the removal order—thus, making the determination to execute his removal nondiscretion-
ary and, therefore, outside the scope of § 1252(g). See id. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. at 940–41. 
 77 Id. at 940. The Eighth Circuit noted that even if the intent of the legislature was to limit 
§ 1252(g) to discretionary decisions, the fact that the statute does not explicitly make that distinction 
controls. See id. at 941 (“Congress often passes statutes that sweep more broadly than the main prob-
lem they were designed to address.” (quoting Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 288 (2006))). 
 78 Id. at 942. 
 79 Arce, 899 F.3d at 801. 
 80 Id. at 798–99. U.S. Customs and Border Patrol officers apprehended and detained Arce in Ade-
lanto, California where he expressed fear of harm if removed from the country. Id. at 798. An asylum 
officer determined that Arce did not successfully establish a reasonable fear of persecution or torture, 
which is required to grant asylum. Id. An immigration judge affirmed the asylum officer’s finding and 
returned the case to the DHS to effectuate removal. Id. at 798–99. Arce’s lawyer filed an emergency 
petition for review and a motion for stay of removal to the Ninth Circuit. Id. at 799. Upon the filing of 
the motion, the Ninth Circuit issued a temporary stay on the removal order at 11:25 AM. Id. That 
same day, Arce’s attorney faxed a copy of the notice of the stay to the assigned deportation officer and 
attempted numerous calls. Id. Despite the attempts to enforce the issuance of the automatic stay, at 
2:15 PM the federal government deported Arce to Mexico. Id. 
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United States, pursuant to a court order, Arce brought suit against the United 
States under the FTCA in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of 
California.81 The district court dismissed Arce’s complaint for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction because his claims were precluded by the exclusive juris-
diction provision of the INA.82 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of 
Arce’s complaint.83 In doing so, the Ninth Circuit rejected the government’s 
argument that the FTCA claims fell within the exclusion because they arose 
from the Secretary’s decision to execute the removal order.84 The court deter-
mined that the government’s interpretation of the provision was too broad.85 
The Ninth Circuit determined that the exclusive jurisdiction provision did not 
apply because Arce was not challenging the validity of the removal order.86 
Rather, the basis of Arce’s claim was that the Secretary did not have the au-
thority to execute his removal from the United States given the stay of removal 
issued by the court.87 Therefore, the court held that Arce’s claims did not arise 
from the Secretary’s decision to execute his removal, but rather from the viola-
tion of the court’s order.88 Therefore, Arce’s claim was outside the scope of the 
exclusive jurisdiction provision.89 The Ninth Circuit determined that its hold-
ing was in accordance with the Supreme Court’s instruction in AADC to con-
strue the statute narrowly.90 Further, the Ninth Circuit’s holding also followed 
                                                                                                                           
 81 Id. Prior to bringing this action in federal district court, and in accordance with the require-
ments set forth in the FTCA, Arce first filed an administrative claim with the DHS, which it denied. 
Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (2018) (instructing that a claimant must first exhaust all administra-
tive remedies and receive a final denial of his or her claim before seeking relief in federal court). Arce 
brought claims of false arrest and imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotion distress, and negli-
gence. Arce, 899 F.3d at 799. 
 82 Arce, 899 F.3d at 799. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. at 799–800. The government contended that the DHS’s violation of the court’s stay of re-
moval was irrelevant because § 1252(g) applies “to any action taken in connection with a removal 
order.” Id. at 799. 
 85 Id. at 799–800. 
 86 Id. at 800. 
 87 Id. The Ninth Circuit noted that were it not for the issuance of the stay of removal and the sub-
sequent violation of it by the DHS, Arce would not have had a viable FTCA claim. Id. But for the 
violation of the automatic stay, the DHS would have had complete discretion with respect to when it 
carried out Arce’s removal from the United States, and § 1252(g) would have precluded judicial re-
view of that decision. Id. 
 88 Id. 
 89 Id. The Ninth Circuit noted that the issuance of the stay of removal “temporarily suspended” 
the Secretary’s authority to execute the removal order against Arce. Id. (quoting Nken v. Holder, 566 
U.S. 418, 428–29 (2009)). 
 90 See id. (noting that in deciding AADC, the Supreme Court did not interpret § 1252(g) to “sweep 
in any claim that can technically be said to ‘arise from’ the three listed actions of the Attorney Gen-
eral” (quoting Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 841 (2018))). The Ninth Circuit noted that in 
AADC the Supreme Court held that § 1252(g) did not stop federal courts from reviewing claims relat-
ing to the “multitude of other decisions or actions that may be part of the deportation process.” See id. 
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its own precedent to limit the exclusive jurisdiction provision to discretionary 
decisions.91 
Lastly, the Ninth Circuit took issue with the government’s interpretation 
of the exclusive jurisdiction provision because the court reasoned that such a 
broad reading of the statute would effectively impede the ability of the judici-
ary to enforce its own rulings.92 Further, such an expansive reading of the stat-
ute raised important separation of powers issues.93 The executive branch, 
through its administrative agencies, and the legislative branch, through positive 
statutory law, are insulating immigration decisions from the purview of federal 
courts.94 By denying the judiciary meaningful participation in the immigration 
context, Congress is impeding federal courts’ vested rights under Article III to 
be the final arbiters of federal law.95 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit declined to 
dismiss Arce’s case for lack of jurisdiction because his claims were beyond the 
                                                                                                                           
(quoting AADC, 525 U.S. at 482) (listing examples of other decisions that would be beyond the reach 
of § 1252(g)). Thus, the court determined that a court order staying removal similarly lies beyond the 
jurisdictional reach of § 1252(g). Id. 
 91 Id. The Ninth Circuit noted that, in accordance with its precedent, it refused to apply a broad 
reading of § 1252(g). Id. at 800; see also United States v. Hovespian, 359 F.3d 1144, 1155 (9th Cir. 
2004) (en banc) (holding that § 1252(g) should be interpreted narrowly); Barahona-Gomez v. Reno, 
236 F.3d 1115, 1118–19, 1121 (9th Cir. 2001) (interpreting the Supreme Court’s decision in AADC as 
limiting § 1252(g)’s scope to barring suits challenging discretionary decisions by the Secretary to 
initiate proceedings, adjudicate cases, and execute removal orders). Because the Ninth Circuit deter-
mined that DHS violated its mandatory duty to act in accordance with a court order staying removal, 
its actions were subject to judicial review and Arce’s claims could proceed. Arce, 899 F.3d. at 800–01. 
 92 Arce, 899 F.3d at 801. At oral argument, the government conceded that under its interpretation 
of the statute, courts would lack jurisdiction to sanction the DHS for intentionally deporting a subpoe-
naed witness while under court order not to do so. Id.; see also Oral Argument, supra note 23 (noting 
that the government’s broad interpretation of § 1252(g) would violate the inherent power of the judi-
ciary to initiate contempt proceedings if they relate to decisions by immigration officers to deport 
noncitizens); 11A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2960 (3d ed. 2020) (noting that courts have an inherent power to punish 
contempt and that such power is essential to maintaining the authority and legitimacy of the courts 
and ensuring that justice is administered). 
 93 See Neuman, supra note 42, at 1969–70 (highlighting the importance of judicial review of 
administrative decisions). An independent judiciary is central to the principle of the separation of 
powers amongst the three branches of government. Id. Therefore, judicial review of administrative 
decisions is a necessary check on the powers of the executive and legislative branches. See id. at 1969 
(“[T]he assignment of adjudicatory functions to executive officers and nonindependent tribunals raises 
concerns about separation of powers, fairness to litigants, and the rule of law.”); see also Richard H. 
Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III, 101 HARV. L. REV. 915, 
938 (1988) (highlighting the importance of having an impartial judiciary determine the limits of the 
law and enforce those limits with respect to the actions of the political branches). 
 94 Moore, supra note 24, at 2037–38. 
 95 Id.; see U.S. CONST. art. III; Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177–78 (1803) (hold-
ing that when the Constitution and the law conflict it is “the very essence of judicial duty” to deter-
mine which applies). 
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scope of the exclusive jurisdiction provision, given the DHS’s violation of the 
court order temporarily prohibiting Arce’s removal from the United States.96 
II. UNDERSTANDING THE CIRCUIT SPLIT: WHETHER § 1252(G)  
PRECLUDES SUITS BROUGHT BY NONCITIZENS FOR  
MONETARY DAMAGES UNDER THE FTCA 
At the core of the discrepancy between the rulings of the Eighth and 
Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals is the scope of the exclusive jurisdiction pro-
vision.97 Specifically, the circuits disagreed over whether the provision was 
intended to preclude noncitizens from bringing suits for monetary damages 
against the federal government related to the noncitizens’ wrongful removal 
from the United States.98 The Eighth Circuit, in reaching its conclusion, based 
its holding on the fact that statutory silence on the issue enables them to inter-
pret the statute to preclude such claims.99 In contrast, the Ninth Circuit relied 
on its interpretation of the Supreme Court’s ruling in 1999, in Reno v. Ameri-
can-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (AADC).100 In its precedent, the 
Ninth Circuit has interpreted AADC to limit the exclusive jurisdiction provi-
sion to acts of discretion.101 Thus, the Ninth Circuit held that noncitizen FTCA 
claims for court order violations are beyond the statute’s scope.102 
Section A of this Part examines whether by passing the IIRIRA Congress 
intended for the exclusive jurisdiction provision to preclude noncitizen claims 
for monetary damages.103 Section A also discusses the various issues that arise 
because of the Eighth Circuit’s determination that preclusion is permitted.104 
                                                                                                                           
 96 Arce, 899 F.3d at 801. 
 97 See generally Arce v. United States, 899 F.3d 796, 800 (9th Cir. 2018); Silva v. United States, 
866 F.3d 938, 940 (8th Cir. 2017). 
 98 See Ahmed, supra note 15, at 627 (exploring two possible interpretations of the statutory si-
lence on the issue of whether § 1252(g) prohibits noncitizens from bringing FTCA claims for mone-
tary damages against immigration officials). 
 99 Silva, 866 F.3d at 940; see supra note 77 and accompanying text (discussing the implications 
of statutory silence on their interpretation of § 1252(g)). 
 100 Arce, 899 F.3d at 800; Reno v. AADC, 525 U.S. 471, 482; see also supra note 91 and accom-
panying text (discussing how the Supreme Court’s ruling in AADC influenced the Ninth Circuit’s 
interpretation of § 1252(g)). 
 101 Arce, 899 F.3d at 801. In dicta, however, the Ninth Circuit suggested that even if it were not 
bound by its precedent to limit 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (g) (2018) to discretionary decisions, it would still 
have come to the same conclusion in Arce based on “common sense.” Id. at 800–01. The Ninth Cir-
cuit reasoned that there was no evidence that Congress intended for the statute to preclude review of 
any claim that relates tangentially to deportation proceedings. Id. at 801. The Ninth Circuit also noted 
that when interpreting ambiguity in jurisdiction-stripping statutes it adhered to the general rule of 
adopting the narrower interpretation of ambiguous statutory language and presuming in favor of judi-
cial review where possible. Id. 
 102 Id. at 801. 
 103 See infra notes 106–107 and accompanying text. 
 104 See infra notes 108–113 and accompanying text. 
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Section B of this Part discusses whether the Supreme Court’s ruling in AADC 
limited the exclusive jurisdiction provision to discretionary decisions as a way 
to resolve the statutory ambiguity.105 
A. Looking to Legislative Intent of the IIRIRA to Resolve  
the Ambiguity from Statutory Silence 
The preclusion of damages claims brought by noncitizens against immi-
gration officials was neither intended nor contemplated by Congress when it 
passed the IIRIRA in 1996.106 Rather, the legislative history suggests that the 
jurisdiction-stripping provisions were intended to support the act’s goals of 
making it easier to remove deportable noncitizens—not to insulate the execu-
tion of immigration policy entirely from the judiciary.107 Yet, in 2017, the 
Eighth Circuit in Silva v. United States determined that irrespective of legislative 
intent, statutory silence coupled with the broad language of the exclusive juris-
diction provision precludes noncitizens from bringing FTCA claims related to 
their wrongful removal from the United States.108 Such a determination, howev-
er, raises additional questions that make this interpretation seem untenable.109 
Absent explicit congressional instruction stating that IIRIRA precludes 
noncitizens from bringing claims under the FTCA, there are two additional 
options for interpreting legislative intent.110 First, in passing the IRRIRA, 
Congress repealed the FTCA with respect to immigration cases.111 Second, if 
the FTCA was not repealed, then the Eighth Circuit’s reading of the exclusive 
jurisdiction provision suggests that immigration officials are uniquely exempt-
ed from liability under the FTCA although all other federal officials are liable 
                                                                                                                           
 105 See infra notes 114–122 and accompanying text. 
 106 See Ahmed, supra note 15, at 627–28 (noting that the legislative history of § 1252(g) demon-
strates that Congress did not intend for the exclusive jurisdiction provision to prohibit federal courts 
from having jurisdiction over monetary damages brought by noncitizens); see also Flynn & Patterson, 
supra note 42, at 561 (discussing the substantive effects of the passage of the IIRIRA on immigration 
law in accordance with its stated purpose to “streamline the removal process”). 
 107 See Ahmed, supra note 15, at 628–29 (detailing excerpts from congressional testimony and 
Senate reports demonstrating that the purpose of the jurisdiction-stripping provisions of § 1252(g) was 
to further the goals of the Act to eliminate undue delay in the removal process). The section of IIRIRA 
that was dedicated to judicial review provisions was originally entitled “Streamlining Judicial Review 
of Orders of Exclusion or Deportation.” Id. at 628. 
 108 Id. at 629. The Eighth Circuit adopted the government’s argument in Silva. 866 F.3d at 940–
41. 
 109 See Ahmed, supra note 15, at 629–30 (outlining several reasons why statutory silence on the 
issue of whether FTCA claims are precluded under § 1252(g) of the INA does not suggest that such 
claims are in fact precluded). 
 110 Id. at 630, 635. 
 111 Id. at 630. Counsel for Arce raised and dispelled this issue regarding repeal of the FTCA by 
Congress at oral argument before the Ninth Circuit. See Oral Argument, supra note 23 (noting that 
U.S. jurisprudence regarding implicit statutory repeal indicates that such findings are heavily disfa-
vored, and that for one act to repeal another, Congress must explicitly state their intention). 
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for their actions.112 Some argue that such an interpretation, however, would 
clearly violate the venerable maxim that “no man is above the law.”113 
B. Whether AADC Resolves the Statutory Ambiguity by Limiting § 1252(g) 
to Preclude Judicial Review of Only Discretionary Decisions 
One way to reconcile the statutory silence and the perceived ambiguity 
regarding whether the exclusive jurisdiction provision precludes FTCA claims 
related to wrongful removal of noncitizens is to look to the Supreme Court’s 
holding in AADC.114 The Ninth Circuit, in 2018, in Arce v. United States 
looked to the holding of AADC and came to the opposite conclusion of the 
Eighth Circuit.115 In AADC, the Supreme Court held that the exclusive jurisdic-
tion provision should be narrowly construed.116 The Court in AADC held that 
the exclusive jurisdiction provision of IIRIRA applies only to three “discrete” 
actions taken by an immigration official.117 Specifically, the Court held that 
judicial review was precluded only when the review was related to a decision 
or action to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or executive removal 
orders.118 The Court made clear that the language of the exclusive jurisdiction 
provision does not apply to all claims arising out of removal proceedings.119 
                                                                                                                           
 112 See Ahmed, supra note 15, at 635 (noting that to accept the proposition that § 1252(g) pre-
cludes recovery for FTCA claims would create “unwarranted and unprecedented exception[s]” for 
immigration officials because they would be the only government officials immune from liability 
under the FTCA). 
 113 See Humphries v. Various Fed. U.S. INS Emps., 164 F.3d 936, 951 (5th Cir. 1999) (Dennis, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (rejecting the majority’s determination that § 1252(g) precludes 
noncitizens from bringing Bivens claims seeking monetary damages). In his opinion, Judge James L. 
Dennis argued that under the majority’s holding, a federal immigration official would have a jurisdic-
tional defense to a Bivens claim, whereas any other federal officer would not: 
Our system of jurisprudence rests on the assumption that all individuals, whatever their 
position in government, are subject to federal law: “No man in this country is so high 
that he is above the law. No officer of the law may set that law at defiance with impuni-
ty. All officers of the government, from the highest to the lowest, are creatures of the 
law, and are bound to obey it.” 
Id. (quoting United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882)). 
 114 AADC, 525 U.S. at 482 (instructing that § 1252(g) should be read narrowly and applied to only 
three distinct actions taken by the Secretary). 
 115 Arce, 899 F.3d at 800–01. The Ninth Circuit directly addressed the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning 
and noted that even if it were not bound by its precedent it still would have come to the same conclu-
sion based on a variety of factors, including the Supreme Court’s ruling in AADC. See supra note 101 
and accompanying text (discussing other factors beyond stare decisis that persuaded the Ninth Circuit 
to adopt a narrower reading of § 1252(g)). 
 116 AADC, 525 U.S. at 482. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Id. 
 119 See id. (“It is implausible that the mention of three discrete events along the road to deporta-
tion was a shorthand way of referring to all claims arising from deportation proceedings.”). 
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Therefore, the Ninth Circuit in Arce interpreted the exclusive jurisdiction 
provision to apply only to discretionary decisions of immigration officials.120 
In the immigration context, the ability of agencies to determine whether immi-
gration laws should be enforced against a particular noncitizen is discretion-
ary.121 Under the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation, the decision of immigration 
officials to deport a noncitizen when there is a court order or automatic stay 
prohibiting their removal was not within the scope of the exclusive jurisdiction 
provision because the agency lacked the discretion to remove them.122 Thus, as 
interpreted by the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court’s ruling in AADC provided 
guidance on the scope of the exclusive jurisdiction provision with respect to 
noncitizen FTCA claims for wrongful removal.123 
III. THE NINTH CIRCUIT IN ARCE CORRECTLY ALLOWED NONCITIZEN 
WRONGFUL REMOVAL CLAIMS TO PROCEED UNDER THE FTCA 
The Ninth Circuit’s holding in 2018, in Arce v. United States, that the ex-
clusive jurisdiction provision does not preclude federal courts from reviewing 
a noncitizen’s FTCA claim, arising from their removal from the United States 
in violation of a court order, is more persuasive than the Eighth Circuit’s con-
clusion on three grounds.124 
First, the Ninth Circuit correctly interpreted the provision to insulate only 
discretionary actions taken by the Secretary of the DHS from judicial re-
view.125 Limiting the provision to discretionary actions follows the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation that the provision’s function is similar to shielding pros-
ecutorial discretion from judicial review in the criminal context.126 
Second, the Eighth Circuit’s determination in 2017, in Silva v. United 
States, that the exclusive jurisdiction provision applies to both discretionary 
and nondiscretionary decisions raises important separation of power issues.127 
Both the Eighth Circuit’s holding in Silva and the argument put forth by the 
government in Arce would effectively impede federal courts from enforcing 
                                                                                                                           
 120 Arce, 899 F.3d at 800; see Ahmed, supra note 15, at 631–32; Wadhia, supra note 53, at 64–65. 
 121 Wadhia, supra note 53, at 41–42. 
 122 Arce, 899 F.3d at 800; see Ahmed, supra note 15, at 632 (“Courts have made it clear that gov-
ernment officials do not have discretion to violate the law or the Constitution.”). 
 123 Arce, 899 F.3d at 800. 
 124 See Arce v. United States, 899 F.3d 796, 800–01 (9th Cir. 2018) (acknowledging the contrary 
holding in the Eighth Circuit).   
 125 See id. (construing § 1252(g) narrowly). 
 126 See supra note 53 and accompanying text (discussing the role of prosecutorial discretion in the 
immigration context); see also Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 841 (2018) (affirming that the 
Court’s determination in AADC that § 1252(g) should be read narrowly); Reno v. AADC, 525 U.S. 
471, 475 n.9 (1999) (recognizing that the purpose of § 1252(g) is to prevent the imposition of judicial 
review or control on the exercise of prosecutorial discretion). 
 127 See supra note 93 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of judicial review for 
enforcing and maintaining principles of separation of powers). 
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their own orders.128 The more expansive view taken by the Eighth Circuit in 
Silva of the provision’s scope is problematic because it would leave nonciti-
zens with no avenue for recourse to reign in immigration agencies when they 
are acting beyond the constitutional scope of their powers.129 Judicial review is 
a bedrock principle of the American legal system, and the Eighth Circuit’s 
holding in Silva diminishes the vested rights of the judiciary under Article III 
of the U.S. Constitution because it is the duty of the judiciary to interpret and 
determine the law.130 
Lastly, the Ninth Circuit’s holding will act as a deterrent by discouraging 
immigration agencies from exceeding their congressional mandate.131 The pro-
spect of FTCA liability for improper actions will provide a meaningful check 
on immigration agencies.132 Given the increasing politicization of immigration 
policy, along with noncitizens’ lack of representation in the political process, 
judicial review is even more important because noncitizens are particularly 
vulnerable members of our society.133 
CONCLUSION 
Allowing noncitizens who were wrongfully removed from the United 
States to bring FTCA claims to recover damages for the subsequent harm of 
deportation is a meaningful deterrent to administrative agencies for acting in 
violation of a court order. Although neither party in Arce v. United States nor 
Silva v. United States requested certiorari, it is likely that this issue will recur. 
Given the continued increase in immigration activity under the Trump admin-
                                                                                                                           
 128 See Arce, 899 F.3d at 801 (rejecting a broad interpretation of § 1252(g) because it would in-
hibit the ability of the court to enforce its own orders); Silva v. United States, 866 F.3d 938, 940 (8th 
Cir. 2017) (holding that federal courts do not have jurisdiction to hear damages claims arising from 
the decision to remove a noncitizen from the United States even if that removal violated a court or-
der). 
 129 See Arce, 899 F.3d at 801 (“There is no support for the government’s claim that Congress 
intended to prohibit federal courts from enforcing any court order so long as it is related to or in con-
nection with an immigration proceeding.”). 
 130 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177–78 (1803) (noting the centrality of judi-
cial review in ensuring a meaningful check on the power of the legislative and executive branches); 
Humphries v. Various Fed. U.S. INS Emps., 164 F.3d 936, 943 (5th Cir. 1999) (Dennis, J., dissenting) 
(noting the importance of judicial review in ensuring that government officers act within the bounds of 
their constitutional authority); see also supra note 93 and accompanying text (same). 
 131 See Oral Argument, supra note 23 (noting that the availability of monetary damages is a cru-
cial tool for ensuring that the government can be held accountable when it exceeds the scope of its 
powers). 
 132 See Legomsky, supra note 13, at 1631 (noting that the availability of judicial review will in-
centivize administrative adjudicators to ensure that they have “defensible reason[s]” for their conclu-
sions). 
 133 See id. (noting the heightened importance of judicial review in the immigration context); 
Dickerson, supra note 2 (noting that often those who are wrongfully deported lack resources and an 
attorney, and, consequently, they are deported and no one is aware of the injustice that occurred). 
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istration, and the inability of immigration courts to handle the influx of cases, 
there is a greater likelihood that noncitizens could face wrongful removal. The 
holding in Silva raises significant policy concerns with respect to the ability of 
the judiciary to enforce its own rulings. In addition, there are separation of 
powers issues raised by the prospect of the executive branch violating judicial 
orders with impunity. Therefore, the Supreme Court should clarify its interpre-
tation of the exclusive jurisdiction provision and affirm the Ninth Circuit’s in-
terpretation that limits the scope of § 1252(g) to discretionary decisions of the 
Secretary of the DHS. 
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